Framing: anotaciones
Framing: anotaciones
Disclaimer. Casi todas las citas son de la Wikipedia; decidí tomar algunas anotaciones para aclararme, cuando me vi con más tabs de los que podía contar. Después de absorberme en ello durante un par de días me quemé, y de ahí que algunos de los puntos estén más explorados que otros. La motivación original para ojear todo esto fue mi proyecto arqueológico-biográfico Mis marcadores de Internet, en el que entre otras cosas trato de redescubrir mis inquietudes.
1 Intro
El tema me fascina tanto como a JrEg, a juzgar por Frameworks And Meta-Frameworks o Frameworthless. Quizá por su carácter inescapable, en tanto que, como se dice en el vídeo anterior, al no escoger activamente un framework, ya se está comulgando con el del status quo. O en palabras de la Wikipedia: «Observers will read events seen as purely physical or within a frame of "nature" differently from those seen as occurring with social frames. But we do not look at an event and then "apply" a frame to it. Rather, individuals constantly project into the world around them the interpretive frames that allow them to make sense of it; we only shift frames (or realize that we have habitually applied a frame) when incongruity calls for a frame-shift», lo que me recuerda a las revoluciones científicas como roturas de paradigmas en Kuhn, y que la wiki ejemplifica con: «If someone rapidly closes and opens an eye, we react differently based on if we interpret this as a "physical frame" (they blinked) or a "social frame" (they winked).»; así, y resumiendo, «people build a series of mental "filters" [i.e., a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes, that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events] through biological and cultural influences. They then use these filters to make sense of the world. The choices they then make are influenced by their creation of a frame». O en términos fenomenológicos, la identidad precede a la existencia (Rota), y el ser es como sentido (Heidegger): sin un framework que dote de identidad y sentido, la existencia o el ser son sólo ruido (o, directamente, no son).
Por supuesto, en tanto que los frameworks son «representations, interpretations, and simplifications of reality [...] to reduce the ambiguity of intangible topics by contextualizing the information in such a way that recipients can connect to what they already know.» as «an integral part of conveying and processing data», y «involves social construction of a social phenomenon – by mass media sources, political or social movements, political leaders,», donde «Participation in a language community necessarily influences an individual's perception of the meanings attributed to words or phrases», tenemos que estos se conectan también con mi interés en la epistemología y la filosofía de la ciencia, los sesgos cognitivos, el post-estructuralismo
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(Foucault, Baudrillard...), los juegos del lenguaje de Wittgenstein, la retórica (recordándome a los cabildeos, The Westport Independent, Professor Dave Explains Lies People Tell About Water – Part 2: Special Waters (Raw, Alkaline, Oxygenated, etc.), etc.), etc.Aun más explícito en el llamado «semiotic content analysis».
Personalmente, no encuentro que la entrada de la Wikipedia esté demasiado bien redactada u organizada, pero me ha llevado a Bateson A Theory of Play and Fantasy 1954,
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Goffman Frame Analysis 1974,Cf. 2.1.
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Snow & Benford Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization 1988, conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner),Cf. 2.2.
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cognitive metaphor (Lakoff«According to this theory, elements and vital relations from diverse scenarios are "blended" in a subconscious process, which is assumed to be ubiquitous to everyday thought and language. Much like memetics, it is an attempt to create a unitary account of the cultural transmission of ideas.». (No considero excluyentes las aproximaciones del blend y del alignment/resonance, y en cualquier caso la interacción entre frames no es donde recae mi foco.)
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& Johnson Metaphors We Live By 1980,Autor, junto Rafael Núñez, de Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being 2000. Uno de los disidentes de la gramática generativa (transformacional) de Chomsky en la llamada (por Randy Allen Harris, 1993) «guerra lingüística» (iniciada a 1967), proponiendo en su lugar la semántica generativa de la que se derivaría la lingüística cognitiva.
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Thibodeau & Boroditsky Metaphors We Think With: The Role of Metaphor in Reasoning 2011,Cf. 2.3.
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Holme Mind, Metaphor and Language Teaching 2004,Sus experimentos son interesantes, pero además me han llamado la atención los que toman como inspiración (fuentes 6-11), y que refiera como fundamentación no sólo Tversky & Kahneman, sino también Bransford & Johnson (otro Johnson) Contextual prerequisites for understanding: Some investigations of comprehension and recall respecto a la «importance of narrative structure in instantiating meaning».
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Private Eye ProjectMe parece una aproximación muy curiosa, el explotar dichas ingrain metaphors of a particular language para su enseñanza, exponiéndolas de manera agrupada en una suerte de tesauros.
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), conceptual framework (y por extensión: conceptual model, mental model, cognitive model, mapa cognitivo, cognitive representation«Founded in both inquiry-based learning and active learning approaches, it is designed to accelerate student learning by the development of critical thinking skills, creativity, literacy, and scientific literacy. Some of the main themes are "close observation", "thinking by analogy", "hands-on investigation", "changing scale", and "theorizing".».
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), Gentner Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy 1983 (que resuena con mi interés en teoría de categorías),Enmarcable en el realismo indirecto, con avatares como Russell.
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rhetorical criticism (Kuypers Rhetorical Criticism: Perspectives in Action 2009,«Contemporary cognitive scientists use a wide notion of analogy, extensionally close to that of Plato and Aristotle [of shared abstraction ...]. According to this view, analogy depends on the mapping or alignment of the elements of source and target. The mapping takes place not only between objects, but also between relations of objects and between relations of relations. The whole mapping yields the assignment of a predicate or a relation to the target. [...]
Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1997) developed their multiconstraint theory within structure mapping theory. They defend that the "coherence" of an analogy depends on structural consistency, semantic similarity and purpose. Structural consistency is maximal when the analogy is an isomorphism, although lower levels are admitted. Similarity demands that the mapping connects similar elements and relations of source and target, at any level of abstraction. It is maximal when there are identical relations and when connected elements have many identical attributes. An analogy achieves its purpose insofar as it helps solve the problem at hand.»
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Vatz The Only Authentic Book of Persuasion: The Agenda/Spin Model 2014), media framing (Gitlin The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left 1980, Iyengar Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues 1991«Kuypers' work is based on the premise that framing is a rhetorical process and as such it is best examined from a rhetorical point of view.»
«Although deciding what story to tell (gate-keeping) is the first step in all news reporting, the press takes a second step when determining how much attention to give to the story (agenda-setting), and a third step when they determine how to tell the story (agenda-extension)»
«The results [on President Trump and the News Media] both extends and refutes parts of framing theory by demonstrating how frames do not give rise to moral assessments as previously thought, but rather the presence of moral foundations provide moral substance to frames as they are developed and found throughout news coverage. These results, the first combining framing analysis and moral foundations theory in this manner, reveal how journalists inject bias consciously and unconsciously into hard news stories, and that their moral foundations act to privilege liberal concerns and denigrate conservative concerns.».
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),«According to Iyengar, an episodic news frame "takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances", while a thematic news frame "places public issues in some more general abstract context ... directed at general outcomes or conditions". [...] Further, experimental results indicate participants who watched episodic news coverage of poverty were more than twice as likely as those who watched thematic news coverage of poverty to attribute responsibility of poverty to the poor themselves rather than society. Given the predominance of episodic framing of poverty, Iyengar argues that television news shifts responsibility of poverty from government and society to the poor themselves. After examining content analysis and experimental data on poverty and other political issues, Iyengar concludes that episodic news frames divert citizens' attributions of political responsibility away from society and political elites, making them less likely to support government efforts to address those issue and obscuring the connections between those issues and their elected officials' actions or lack thereof.».
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LuntzNo voy a entrar en si framing does not rely primarily on accessibility but aplicability (Scheufele).
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Words That Work: It's Not What You Say, It's What People Hear 2006, framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman),«Additionally in his 2007 interview on Fresh Air, Luntz discussed his use of the term "energy exploration" to refer to oil drilling. His research on the matter involved showing people a picture of current oil drilling and asking if in the picture it "looks like exploration or drilling." He said that 90 percent of the people he spoke to said it looked like exploring. "Therefore I'd argue that it is a more appropriate way to communicate." He went on to say, "if the public says after looking at the pictures, that doesn't look like my definition of drilling—it looks like my definition of exploring—then don't you think we should be calling it what people see it to be, rather than adding a political aspect to it all?"». Aunque su carrera me causa cierto rechazo, su metodología me resulta interesante y hasta cercana a los think tank. No sé, es como que tiene un cierto aire fenomenológico.
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social constructionism (Berger & LuckmannParadigmático de los equivalency frames, that «offer "different, but logically equivalent phrases", which cause individuals to alter their preferences». E.g., a la hora de escoger entre un tratamiento que salva 200/600 vidas frente a uno que tiene un 33% de posibilidades de salvarlas a todas VS que mata a 400/600 vidas frente a que tiene un 66% de posibilidades de matarlas a todas.
Por su parte, «emphasis frames offer "qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations" which individuals use to make judgments. It is important to note that emphasis framing is distinct from agenda-setting. Emphasis framing represents the changes in the structure of communication to evoke a particular cognitive schema [by the structure of the message]. Agenda setting relies upon the frequency or prominence of a message’s issues to tell people what to think about. [For example,] Participants exposed to the public safety condition considered public safety applicable for deciding whether the Klan should be allowed to hold a rally and, as expected, expressed lower tolerance of the Klan's right to hold a rally. Participants exposed to the free speech condition, however, considered free speech applicable for deciding whether the Klan should be allowed to hold a rally and, as expected, expressed greater tolerance of the Klan's right to hold a rally.».
En cualquier caso, la diferenciación me parece un tanto ingenua, en tanto que parece asumir que los humanos son inherentemente lógicos y que, por ende, un refraseado que preserve su valor lógico no afectara a su interpretación (o lo hará de una manera distintiva, incentivando la dicotomía).
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The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 1966, Pickering Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics 1999, Hersh Experiencing Mathematics: What do we do, when we do mathematics? 2014,A no confundir con Luhmann.
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Elder-Vass The Reality of Social Construction 2012), personal construct theory (y, por extensión, schematas«He held that mathematics is real, and its reality is social-cultural-historical, located in the shared thoughts of those who learn it, teach it, and create it. His article "The Kingdom of Math is Within You" [...] explains how mathematicians' proofs compel agreement, even when they are inadequate as formal logic [sobre esto ya hablé en De las demostraciones]. He sympathized with the perspectives on mathematics of Imre Lakatos and Where Mathematics Comes From».
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), symbolic interactionism (Mead Mind, Self and Society 1934, Blumer Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method 1969), action theory (Parsons The Structure of Social Action 1937), the structure and agency debate...Incluyendo academic rubrics, social schemas, stereotypes, social roles, behavioral scripts, worldviews, and archetypes. Acuñado (en psicología) en Piaget Langage et pensée chez l'enfant 1923, y popularizado en Bartlett Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology 1932, cf. 2.4.
Hago notar que el pragmatismo de Dewey y la fenomenología de Husserl se me han aparecido varias veces durante esta exploración del tópico, por lo que supongo que es bastante natural que despierte mi interés (dado mi gusto por los primeros). También la crítica (al conceptual blending, al symbolic interactionism, etc.) de que no pasan de framework conceptual, sin llegar a concretarse en un modelo conceptual con capacidad predictiva.
2 Extractos
2.1 Bateson A Theory of Play and Fantasy 1954
«"This is play" looks something like this: "These actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote." [donde for which they stand podría sustituirse por "which they denote", entrando en contradicción ...]. According to the Theory of Logical Types such a message is of course inadmissible, because the word "denote" is being used in two degrees of abstraction, [...]
(5) A related problem in the evolution of communication concerns the origin of what Korzybski has called the map-territory relation: the fact that a message, of whatever kind, does not consist of those objects which it denotes ("The word 'eat' cannot scratch us"). Rather, language bears to the objects which it denotes a relationship comparable to that which a map bears to a territory. Denotative communication as it occurs at the human level is only possible after the evolution of a complex set of metalinguistic (but not verbalized) rules which govern how words and sentences shall be related to objects and events. It is therefore appropriate to look for the evolution of such metalinguistic and/or metacommunicative rules at a prehuman and preverbal level. [...]
(8) We might expect threat, play, and histrionics to be three independent phenomena all contributing to the evolution of the discrimination between map and territory. But it seems that this would be wrong, at least so far as mammalian communication is concerned. Very brief analysis of childhood behavior shows that such combinations as histrionic play, bluff, playful threat, teasing play in response to threat, histrionic threat, and so on form together a single total complex of phenomena. [...]
The discrimination between map and territory is always liable to break down, and the ritual blows of peace-making are always liable to be mistaken for the "real" blows ofcombat. [...]
(10) But this leads us to recognition of a more complex form of play; the game which is constructed not upon the premise "This is play" but rather around the question "Is this play?" [...]
(11) Paradox is doubly present in the signals which are exchanged within the context of play, fantasy, threat, etc. Not only does the playful nip not denote what would be denoted by the bite for which it stands, but, in addition, the bite itself is fictional. Not only do the playing animals not quite mean what they are saying but, also, they are usually communicating about something which does not exist. At the human level, this leads to a vast variety of compliCations and inversions in the fields of play, fantasy, and art. Conjurers and painters of the trompe l'oeil school concentrate upon acquiring a virtuosity whose only reward"is reached after the viewer detects that he has been deceived and is forced to smile or marvel at the skill of the deceiver. Hollywood film-makers spend millions of dollars to increase the realism of a shadow. Other artists, perhaps more realistically, insist that art be nonrepresentational; and poker players achieve a strange aadictive realism by equating the chips for which they play with dollars. They still insist, however, that the loser accept his loss as part of the game.
Finally, in the dim region where art, magic, and religion meet and overlap, human beings have evolved the "metaphor that is meant," the flag which men will die to save, and the sacrament that is felt to be more than "an outward and visible sign, given unto us." [...]
But there are other instances where an opposite phenomenon occurs. A man experiences the full intensity of subjective terror when a spear is flung at him out of the 3D screen or when he falls headlong from some peak created in his own mind in the intensity of nightmare. At the moment of terror there was no questioning of "reality," but still there was no spear in the movie house and no cliff in the bedroom. The images did not denote that which they seemed to denote, but these same images did ready evoke that terror which would have been evoked by a real spear or a real precipice. By a similar trick of self-contradiction, the film-makers of Hollywood are free to offer to a puritanical public a vast range of pseudosexual fantasy which otherwise would not be tolerated. [...] The symbols do not denote homosexuality, but do denote ideas for which homosexuality is an appropriate symbol [para dicha puritana audiencia ...].
(13) What has previously been said about play can be used as an introductory example for the discussion of frames and contexts. In sum, it is our hypothesis that the message "This is play" establishes a paradoxical frame comparable to Epimenides' paradox. This frame may be diagrammed thus:
All statetments within this frame are untrue.
[...] The discrimination between "play" and "nonplay," like the discrimination between fantasy and nonfantasy, is certainly a function of secondary process.,or "ego." Within the dream the dreamer is usually unaware that he is dreaming, and within "play" he must often be reminded that "This is play."
Similarly, within dream or fantasy the dreamer does not operate with the concept "untrue." [...]
(19) This whole matter of frames and paradoxes may be illustrated in terms of animal behavior, where three types of message may be recognized or deduced: (a) messages of the sort which we here call mood-signs; (b) messages which simulate mood-signs (in play, threat, histrionics, etc.); and (c) messages. which enable the receiver to discriminate between mood-signs and those other signs which resemble them. The message "This is play" is of this third type. It tells the receiver that certain nips and other meaningful actions are not messages of the first type.
The message "This is play" thus sets a frame of the sort which is likely to precipitate paradox: it is an attempt to discriminate between, or to draw a line between, categories of different logical types.».
El tema del juego es algo que me interesa, así que me voy a tomar la licencia de citar aquí a otro de los sociólogos listados que discute la cuestión:
«Mead stresses two stages in the development of the self: the stages of play and the game. In play the child simply assumes one rôle after another of persons and animals that have in some way or other entered into its life. One here sees, writ large as it were, the assumption of the attitudes of others through the self-stimulation of the vocal gesture, whereas later in life such attitudes are more abbreviated and harder to detect. In the game, however, one has become, as it were, all of the others implicated in the common activity—must have within one’s self the whole organized activity in order to successfully play one’s own part. The person here has not merely assumed the rôle of a specific other, but of any other participating in the common activity; he has generalized the attitude of rôle-taking. In one of Mead’s happiest terms and most fertile concepts he has taken the attitude or rôle of the “generalized other.”».
2.2 Goffman
«Goffman defined "impression management" as a person's attempts to present an acceptable image to those around them, verbally or nonverbally. This definition is based on Goffman's idea that people see themselves as others view them, so they attempt to see themselves as if they are outside looking in. Goffman was also dedicated to discovering the subtle ways humans present acceptable images by concealing information that may conflict with the images for a particular situation, such as concealing tattoos when applying for a job in which tattoos would be inappropriate, or hiding a bizarre obsession such as collecting/interacting with dolls, which society may see as abnormal.
[...] If the audience disagrees with the image someone is presenting then their self-presentation is interrupted. People present images of themselves based on how society thinks they should act in a particular situation. This decision how to act is based on the concept of definition of the situation. Definitions are all predetermined and people choose how they will act by choosing the proper behavior for the situation they are in. Goffman also draws from William Thomas for this concept. Thomas believed that people are born into a particular social class and that the definitions of the situations they will encounter have already been defined for them.
[...] Society is not homogeneous; we must act differently in different settings. This recognition led Goffman to his dramaturgical analysis. He saw a connection between the kinds of "acts" that people put on in their daily lives and theatrical performances. In a social interaction, as in a theatrical performance, there is an onstage area where actors (people) appear before the audience; this is where positive self-concepts and desired impressions are offered. But there is also a backstage—a hidden, private area where people can be themselves and drop their societal roles and identities.», lo que me recuerda a la ética de Aristón de Quíos, en la que «el sabio se asemeja a un buen actor» (Laercio).
Y luego continua: «Essentially, through interaction, we are only looking to be heard, not inspire any kind of action but simply to know that someone listened and understood. This is why often a simple head nod or grunt is accepted as an appropriate response in conversation.
[...] Signaling a change in key is one way that framing often takes place, "special brackets will have to be introduced should he want to say something in a relatively serious way: "Kidding aside," "Now, I'm really serious about this," and other such tags become necessary as a means of momentarily down keying the flow of words."
[...] Context is one other element to framing that is essential. "The participants will be bound by norms of good manners: through frequency and length of turns at talk, through topics avoided, through circumspection in regard to references about self, through attention offered eagerly or begrudgingly-through all these means, rank and social relationship will be given their due." Certain things can and will be said in one scenario that would never be uttered in another. An awareness of these social framings is critical, just as is an awareness of the audience. Depending on who you're speaking with (a teacher, a child, a loved one, a friend, a pet, etc.) you will curve your speech to fit the frame of what your intended audience is expecting.
Goffman uses the metaphor of conversation being a stage play. A plays tone will shift throughout the performance due to the actions taken by the actors; this is similar to how a discussion is keyed – based on what either person says or does over the course of an interaction, the key will change accordingly. The parallels go further, though.».
2.3 Embodied cognition theory: Lakoff y Gibbs
«Lakoff further argues that one of the reasons liberals have had difficulty since the 1980s is that they have not been as aware of their own guiding metaphors, and have too often accepted conservative terminology framed in a way to promote the strict father metaphor. Lakoff insists that liberals must cease using terms like partial birth abortion and tax relief because they are manufactured specifically to allow the possibilities of only certain types of opinions. Tax relief for example, implies explicitly that taxes are an affliction, something someone would want "relief" from. To use the terms of another metaphoric worldview, Lakoff insists, is to unconsciously support it. Liberals must support linguistic think tanks in the same way that conservatives do if they are going to succeed in appealing to those in the country who share their metaphors.
[...] Lakoff states that he explicitly rejects cognitive relativism, arguing that he is "a realist, both about how the mind works and how the world works. Given that the mind works by frames and metaphors, the challenge is to use such a mind to accurately characterize how the world works."».
«A conceptual domain [aka conceptual framework] can be any mental organization of human experience. The regularity with which different languages employ the same metaphors, often perceptually based, has led to the hypothesis that the mapping between conceptual domains corresponds to neural mappings in the brain.
[...] So not only is our everyday communication shaped by the language of conceptual metaphors, but so is the very way we understand scholarly theories. These metaphors are prevalent in communication and we do not just use them in language; we actually perceive and act in accordance with the metaphors.
[...] Nietzsche for example, claimed that language as a whole did not portray reality but instead made a series of bold metaphors. Nietzsche believed that each step of cognition, the transfer of real world information to nerve stimuli, the culmination of nerve stimuli into mental images, the translation of mental images to words, was metaphorical.».
«Gibbs [Embodiment and Cognitive Science 2006] promotes a dynamic framework of embodiment that differs from the more traditional reductionist model of cognition. Gibbs says that embodiment refers not only to neural events but also to cognitive unconscious and to phenomenological experience. Gibbs discusses the relationship between body and consciousness from many different viewpoints and talks about the epistemological opposition between realism and idealism.
What's the difference between Embodied Metaphor and Abstraction from Experience? Gibbs' claim that abstract concepts arise by metaphor from embodied reality is sometimes hard to distinguish from the traditional empiricist view. For the most part same evidence can be used to support both views. Gibbs admits that the metaphor, which forms an abstract concept, does not preserve all aspects of the original bodily experience; so abstraction from experience might be a better term. The real originality of the embodied metaphor view is the claim that something of the embodied nature of the original experience still operates whenever an abstract concept is used. Gibbs states that the original experience persists in a schematic form called an image schema [que me recuerda a los juegos epistemicos]. He defines image schemas as analog representations of spatial relations and movements in space. For example, Gibbs lists a number of bodily experiences of the form "Some part of the body is too hot/cold/etc.": My head is too hot My hand is too cold My mouth feels too dry. He states that these are all instances of a single image schema, the balance schema.»
Relevante a todo este respecto me parece el fenómeno de la ideasthesia, que en cierto modo contraviene the principle of unidirectionality: «the metaphorical process typically goes from the more concrete to the more abstract, and not the other way around.».
Aside: «Gibbs however, says that there are cases in which a speaker's speech is understood as ironic even though there is clear recognition that the comment was not meant to be taken in that manner. An example Gibbs’ uses to show this is if two students were cheating on an exam together and than afterwards one of them says “I would never be involved in any cheating”. This is clearly meant to be ironic to both the speaker and the listener. However, if you take just a slightly different story such as two students were taking a test and one of them copied off of the other without their knowledge. Than after the test someone asked the person who didn't know he was copied off of, “ do you cheat?” he answered, “ I would never be involved in any cheating.” Now this sentence was not meant to be ironic, however the student that cheated off of him may take this as ironic even though it was not intended to be.»
2.4 Bartlett
«The original concept of schemata is linked with that of reconstructive memory as proposed and demonstrated in a series of experiments by Frederic Bartlett. By presenting participants with information that was unfamiliar to their cultural backgrounds and expectations and then monitoring how they recalled these different items of information (stories, etc.), Bartlett was able to establish that individuals' existing schemata and stereotypes influence not only how they interpret "schema-foreign" new information but also how they recall the information over time. One of his most famous investigations involved asking participants to read a Native American folk tale, "The War of the Ghosts",and recall it several times up to a year later. All the participants transformed the details of the story in such a way that it reflected their cultural norms and expectations, i.e. in line with their schemata. The factors that influenced their recall were:
- Omission of information that was considered irrelevant to a participant;
- Transformation of some of the details, or of the order in which events, etc., were recalled; a shift of focus and emphasis in terms of what was considered the most important aspects of the tale;
- Rationalization: details and aspects of the tale that would not make sense would be "padded out" and explained in an attempt to render them comprehensible to the individual in question;
- Cultural shifts: the content and the style of the story were altered in order to appear more coherent and appropriate in terms of the cultural background of the participant.
Bartlett's work was crucially important in demonstrating that long-term memories are neither fixed nor immutable but are constantly being adjusted as schemata evolve with experience. His work contributed to a framework of memory retrieval in which people construct the past and present in a constant process of narrative/discursive adjustment. Much of what people "remember" is confabulated narrative (adjusted and rationalized) which allows them to think of the past as a continuous and coherent string of events, even though it is probable that large sections of memory (both episodic and semantic) are irretrievable or inaccurate at any given time.
[...] The self-schema can also be self-perpetuating. It can represent a particular role in society that is based on stereotype, for example: "If a mother tells her daughter she looks like a tom boy, her daughter may react by choosing activities that she imagines a tom boy would do. Conversely, if the mother tells her she looks like a princess, her daughter might choose activities thought to be more feminine."», lo que me recuerda a las profecías auto-cumplidas.
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